IF KNOWLEDGE THEN GOD: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEISTIC ARGUMENTS OF PLANTINGA AND VAN TIL James Anderson Abstract The two Christian philosophers Alvin Plantinga and Cornelius Van Til have much in common in terms of their religious upbringing, their education, their approach to Christian philosophy, and their work on the relationship between epistemology and metaphysics. In particular, both have claimed that the existence of God is in some weighty sense a precondition of human knowledge. In this paper, I review and compare a selection of epistemological theistic arguments inspired by their writings — three from Plantinga and four from Van Til — and through drawing attention to significant points of similarity and difference suggest some ways in which such arguments might be further developed with an eye to insights gleaned from these two thinkers.
IF KNOWLEDGE THEN GOD: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEISTIC ARGUMENTS OF PLANTINGA AND VAN TIL
Circular Reasoning – Answers in Genesis
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Do Christians use circular reasoning when they presuppose that God exists? Is circular reasoning a logical fallacy? Darius and Karin Viet explain.
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Presuppositional Apologetics and Circular Reasoning
Douglas Wilson, John M. Frame and James N. Anderson answer the typical refutation of presuppositional apologetics that it is circular reasoning and begging the question.
Does Presuppositionalism Engage in Question-Begging?
The Gospel Coalition is running a series on methods in apologetics. The latest installment is “Questioning Presuppositionalism” by Dr. Paul Copan, who raises four criticisms of presuppositionalism, one of which is the old canard that presuppositionalists engage in fallacious circular reasoning. (I think all four are misguided in one way or another, but the other three will have to wait for now.) He writes:
Dr. Copan is a gentleman and a scholar, so I’m sure he doesn’t realize quite how insulting this sounds to presuppositionalists! (For comparison, imagine someone claiming that evidentialists commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent because they use inductive inferences.) This criticism has been answered many times, so it’s disappointing to find it cropping up yet again (although perhaps presuppositionalists should take comfort from the fact that Dr. Copan doesn’t offer any new criticisms!). Even so, I’ll try to explain one more time why this complaint so badly misses the mark. |